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GROH V. RAMIREZ: STRENGTHENING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT,
WEAKENING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
If there is one conclusion that legal scholars seem to agree on
regarding Fourth Amendment law, it is that the law is a "mess."'
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2
The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is "to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions by governmental officials."3 The amendment generally re-
quires that searches and seizures be reasonable and that war-
rants meet specific requirements.4 The simplicity of the Fourth
Amendment, however, ends there.
1. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV.
757, 800 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, First Principles] ("[M]y aim here is to provide a way
out of the mess that is the current Fourth Amendment."); Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style
Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329
(1973) ("The fourth amendment cases are a mess!"); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 20 (1988)
("(Tihere is virtual unanimity... that the Court simply has made a mess of search and
seizure law."). Even Supreme Court Justices have commented on the confusion surround-
ing the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J.) ("[Tihe decisions of this Court dealing with the constitutionality of war-
rantless searches ... suggest that this branch of the law is something less than a seamless
web."); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures.., has not-to put it mildly-
run smooth.").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)
("The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness ... ."); Atwater v. City of
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First, the Supreme Court of the United States has not always
been clear in defining when a search without a warrant is inher-
ently unreasonable.5 Second, when the courts deem a warrant
necessary, they have sometimes struggled to define what makes a
warrant valid, especially regarding the particularity require-
ment.6 Finally, when a warrant fails and the search is deemed
unconstitutional, there has been confusion when determining
whether the officer conducting the search is entitled to qualified
immunity.7
Recently, in Groh v. Ramirez,' the Supreme Court examined
whether the mistaken omission in a warrant of a description of
the particular things to be seized made an otherwise valid search
unconstitutional, and, if so, whether the executing officer would
then be entitled to qualified immunity.9 Part II of this note pro-
vides a brief history of the warrant requirement, the particularity
requirement, and qualified immunity. Part III discusses the fac-
tual and procedural history, as well as the holding, of Groh. Part
IV analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions of Groh. Fi-
nally, Part V discusses the potential impact of the Groh decision.
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per curiam) ("'[T]he touchstone of our analysis un-
der the Fourth Amendment is always "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.").
5. Compare Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947) (allowing warrantless
search incident to arrest, as long as reasonable), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (overruling Trupiano v. United States and returning to reasonableness
standard), with Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (requiring warrant for
searches incident to arrest where reasonably practicable), and Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (overruling Harris and Rabinowitz and returning to the Trupiano
standard requiring a warrant for searches incident to arrest where reasonably practica-
ble).
6. Larry EchoHawk & Paul EchoHawk, Curing a Search Warrant that Fails to Par-
ticularly Describe the Place to Be Searched, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). The particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment warrant clause requires the warrant to "particu-
larly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
7. See infra Part II.C.2. Qualified immunity provides certain protection to a govern-
ment officer against civil actions brought against the officer by citizens whose constitu-
tional rights have allegedly been violated by the officer. See infra Part II.C.
8. 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004).
9. Id. at 1287.
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II. HISTORY
A. The Warrant Requirement
While the idea that a person's home should be protected
against arbitrary invasion dates back to biblical times,'0 and the
idea that citizens should be protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures was well established in England by the end
of the seventeenth century, 1 there has been much scholarly de-
bate as to whether early common law or the Fourth Amendment
provided that warrantless searches were inherently unreason-
able.'2 Such debate aside, it is clear that the Supreme Court of
the United States in the last fifty years has established a "'strong
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." 3 Ac-
cording to the Court, requiring a warrant serves the dual purpose
of ensuring through judicial approval that an objective mind
weighs the need to invade someone's privacy "in order to enforce
10. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-14 (1937); William John Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791, at xcii-c (reprint 1997 by Univ.
Microfilms Int'l) (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School)
(providing a comprehensive discussion regarding the origin and emergence of the right to
privacy in the home, beginning in biblical times until its adoption in 1791); see also Joseph
J. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, Part One, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278 (1969) (tracing the history behind the Fourth
Amendment, beginning in medieval times).
11. See Cuddihy, supra note 10, at 47-48.
12. Akhil Reed Amar and Tracey Maclin have engaged in a robust, contemporary de-
bate regarding whether the Fourth Amendment demands, or whether search and seizure
law predating the Fourth Amendment ever demanded, that a warrant be required in order
for searches and seizures to be reasonable. Compare Amar, First Principles, supra note 1,
at 761-81 (asserting that the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant, even pre-
sumptively), and Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of As-
sistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 72-75 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Boston] (rebutting
Maclin's assertion in When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the Disease
that a "warrant preference" rule exists), with Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-13 (1994) [hereinafter
Maclin, Cure] (rebutting Amar's assertion in First Principles that the Fourth Amendment
does not require a warrant), and Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 930-38, 950-59 (1997) [hereinafter
Maclin, Complexity] (rebutting Amar's proposition in First Principles that the Fourth
Amendment does not require a warrant and Amar's proposition in The Fourth Amend-
ment, Boston, and Writs of Assistance that the Fourth Amendment does not include a
"warrant preference").
13. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 236 (1983)); see also Amar, First Principles, supra note 1, at 801 (commenting on
the Court's "obsession" with warrants and probable cause).
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the law,""4 and "assur[ing] the individual whose property is
searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing offi-
cer.
" 15
The Supreme Court has traditionally held that, absent exigent
circumstances or consent, a warrantless entry is unconstitu-
tional. 6 This is especially true when the search involves a per-
son's home, as freedom from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion in one's home goes to "the very core" of the Fourth
Amendment. 17 A number of exceptions to the rule that war-
rantless entries are unconstitutional, however, do exist, including
automobile searches," searches incident to arrest, 9 and adminis-
trative searches of "closely regulated" businesses,2 ° among oth-
ers.
2 1
B. The Particularity Requirement
1. Overview of the Particularity Requirement
While scholars may still debate whether a warrant is necessary
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment,22 the text of the amendment
makes clear that a warrant may not be issued unless it "particu-
larly describ[es] the place to be searched, and the persons or
14. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
15. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387
U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
16. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454.
17. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
31 ("With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reason-
able and hence constitutional must be answered no."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971)). ("It is a 'basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.")
18. See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478,487-88 (1985).
19. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
20. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
21. The Supreme Court has allowed warrantless searches in a variety of other cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (consent
searches); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (motor home searches); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (border searches); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (exigent circumstances).
22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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things to be seized."23 This particularity requirement serves to
prevent general searches24 and assures the subject of the search
of the limits of the authority of the executing officer.2 1 "[A] search
conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the par-
ticularity requirement ... is unconstitutional."26 Generally, the
warrant must be particular enough to "'make[ I general searches
under them impossible and prevent[ I the seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the war-
rant."'2 7
2. Curing a Search Warrant Lacking Particularity
While the Supreme Court has been clear that a warrant lack-
ing particularity is unconstitutional, the Court has not clarified
the precise circumstances under which a warrant lacking particu-
larity can be cured.2" All jurisdictions have held a warrant lack-
ing particularity to be valid where an affidavit particularly de-
scribing the things to be searched or seized is explicitly
incorporated by reference in and physically attached to the war-
rant.29 Some jurisdictions have only required that the affidavit be
incorporated by reference in and accompany the warrant, ° while
others have simply allowed for either incorporation by reference
or attachment.3'
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See LASSON, supra note 10, at 51-78, and Cuddihy, supra
note 10, at 1002-181, for a description of the important events in the few decades leading
up to the adoption of the particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment.
24. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
25. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
26. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 n.5 (1984); see also Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965).
27. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485 (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196
(1927)).
28. EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 6, at 14.
29. Id. at 15; see, e.g., United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1395 (10th Cir. 1993)
(requiring incorporation by reference and attachment). All jurisdictions except for the
Tenth Circuit, however, impose a lower standard. EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 6,
at 15.
30. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2000); United
States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Nelson, 36 F.3d 758,
760 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 847-48 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United
States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 681 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 845 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding by
20051
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Some jurisdictions have gone even further by allowing an affi-
davit to cure a deficient warrant, even where it is neither incor-
porated by reference in nor accompanying the warrant, as long as
the "functional equivalent" of those requirements has been met.32
For example, the Seventh Circuit has held that "an affidavit sup-
plying the requisite specificity.., need not be physically ap-
pended to the warrant or explicitly incorporated by reference
where the magistrate considered the affidavit in issuing the war-
rant and the officers complied with the affidavit when executing
the warrant."33 The circuit courts have clearly not reached a con-
sensus as to how a warrant lacking particularity may be cured,
and the Supreme Court has yet to provide an answer.
C. Qualified Immunity
1. Objective Standard of Reasonableness
Under the rule of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics,34 a citizen whose constitutional rights
have been violated by a federal officer has the right to bring a
private action for damages against that officer. This right, how-
ever, is limited. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,36 the Supreme Court of
the United States held that "government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
reference sufficient); United States v. Washington, 852 F.2d 803, 805 (4th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing incorporation by reference or attachment sufficient).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1117 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[W]e should
not adhere to formal requirements of incorporation and attachment where as here, it is
clear that the involved parties were aware of the scope of and limitations on the search.");
United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1499 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding a search valid,
notwithstanding the warrant failing to describe the property to be searched, where "the
executing officer[ I is the affiant who describes the property [to be searched] to the judge,
and the judge finds probable cause... . and the search is confined to the [described] ar-
eas"); United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1350-51, 1351 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding that an ambiguity in a warrant could be cured by an affidavit that is not incorpo-
rated by reference in nor attached to a warrant).
33. United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 1997).
34. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
35. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000) (creating a federal action against state or local government actors violating a citi-
zen's constitutional rights); Charles W. Thomas, Resolving the Problem of Qualified Im-
munity for Private Defendants in Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits, 53 LA. L. REV.
449, 456-58 (1992) (providing an overview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
36. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."37 In the context of a search, the Court
later characterized the dispositive question as "whether the offi-
cers reasonably believed that the search they conducted was au-
thorized by a valid warrant." 8
In Malley v. Briggs,39 the Supreme Court further defined the
boundaries of objective reasonableness by describing the qualified
immunity defense broadly as "provid[ing] ample protection to all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law."4° In the same opinion, however, the Court limited the de-
fense where a warrant application so lacks an "indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable,"41
notwithstanding a magistrate's authorization of the search.42
2. "Clearly Established" Right
In Anderson v. Creighton,43 the Supreme Court of the United
States reviewed an Eighth Circuit decision, the holding of which
provided that an FBI agent was not entitled to qualified immu-
nity because "the right to be free from warrantless searches of
one's home unless the searching officers have probable cause ...
was clearly established."44 The Court rejected this reasoning as
too broad, holding that, while the specific action in question does
not need to have been previously held unlawful, "[tihe contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
37. Id. at 818 (emphasis added). The significance of Harlow was to establish a "wholly
objective standard" of reasonableness when determining whether a government official is
entitled to qualified immunity. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984); see also Kit
Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA.
L. REV. 597, 597-98 (1989). The Court later held qualified immunity provided "immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985).
38. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 (1984).
39. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
40. Id. at 341.
41. Id. at 345.
42. Id. at 345-346 (citing Unites States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
43. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that an FBI agent, partici-
pating in a warrantless search of the plaintiffs' home, lacked probable cause. Id. at 637-
38.
44. Id. at 640.
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would understand that what he is doing violates that right."45 As
the Supreme Court has continued to refine the "clearly estab-
lished" standard,46 there have been different interpretations in
the lower courts,47 as seen in the following cases.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Robinson v. Bibb,4" for example, stated that "[iun order to be
clearly established, a question must be decided either by the
highest state court in the state where the case arose, by a United
States Court of Appeals, or by the Supreme Court."49 Frank Bibb
was a police officer who had fatally shot William Taylor, who fled
when Bibb identified himself as a police officer upon catching
Taylor in the act of dismantling Bibb's car.5" The incident oc-
curred just four days after the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled in Tennessee v. Garner5 that to shoot a fleeing sus-
pect is a violation of the suspect's constitutional rights.52 Bibb ar-
gued in his defense that he could not reasonably be expected to be
aware of a four-day-old ruling.53 The Sixth Circuit ruled that
Bibb's argument might have been convincing if not for the fact
45. Id. The Court has since reiterated that "a general constitutional rule... may ap-
ply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though 'the very action in
question has [not] previously been held unlawful.'" United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
271 (1997) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (alteration in origi-
nal).
46. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) ("The relevant, dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a rea-
sonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."); Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615-17 (1999) (holding that "it was not unreasonable for a police offi-
cer in April 1992 to have believed that bringing media observers along during the execu-
tion of an arrest warrant (even in a home) was lawful," where there were no "cases of con-
trolling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident that clearly established
the rule on which [the petitioners] seek to rely," nor a "consensus of cases of persuasive
authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were law-
ful").
47. See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It is not clear.
how a court should determine well-established rights: should our reference be the opinions
of the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals, District Courts, the state courts, or all of the
foregoing?... [How broadly or narrowly defined is the right that must be well-
established?").
48. 840 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1988).
49. Id. at 351.
50. Id. at 350.
51. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
52. Robinson, 840 F.2d at 350. As the Court noted, in Garner, "the Supreme Court
held for the first time that the use of deadly force in apprehending a nondangerous fleeing
felon is a violation of the fourth amendment." Id. at 350 & n.1.
53. Id.
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that the Sixth Circuit had already ruled two years prior, in Gar-
ner v. Memphis Police Department,54 that it is unconstitutional to
shoot a fleeing suspect.55 The Sixth Circuit thus held that Bibb's
defense failed because the right had been "clearly established" at
the time of Taylor's shooting.5"
In Harris v. Young,57 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit established a slightly more restrictive stan-
dard for "clearly established."" The court determined that, even if
the Fourth Circuit had established a particular principle in a
prior decision, the law may still not be considered "clearly estab-
lished" where the decision was split.59
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Wood v. Ostrander,60 alternatively articulated a very
broad definition of "clearly established" by holding that, though
no Supreme Court case and no Ninth Circuit case had established
the law, a Seventh Circuit decision was sufficient to "clearly es-
tablish" the law where "it was likely ... that [the Ninth Circuit]
would have come to the same result."1
III. FACTS AND HOLDING OF GROH
In 1997, Agent Jeff Groh of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms led a team of officers in a search of Joseph Ramirez's
Montana ranch for illegal weapons. Prior to the search, Groh
completed and delivered to the magistrate a warrant application,
54. 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983).
55. Robinson, 840 F.2d at 351.
56. Id.
57. 718 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1983). This case involved an inmate alleging a violation of
his constitutional rights for not receiving sufficient access to an adequate law library dur-
ing his two and one-half years in jail. Id. at 621.
58. See id. at 624.
59. Id. ("It would not be fair to hold a state official liable for not fulfilling 'clearly es-
tablished' obligations when a federal Circuit Court of Appeals was unable to unaminously
decide the same issue [in a separate, prior action].").
60. 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989). This case involved a claim brought by the female
passenger of a car against a state trooper who she claimed arrested the intoxicated driver,
impounded the car, and abandoned her in a high crime area, where she was subsequently
raped after accepting a ride home from a stranger. Id. at 586.
61. Id. at 593-94.
62. Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1287-88 (2004).
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supporting affidavit, and warrant form. Upon review of the
documents, the magistrate signed the warrant, which recited his
satisfaction that the affidavit established sufficient probable
cause and "sufficient grounds existed for the warrant's issu-
ance."64 While the application and affidavit particularly described
the things to be seized, the warrant did not.65 Nor did the warrant
incorporate by reference the list of things contained in the appli-
cation.66 In the section of the warrant asking for a description of
the things to be seized, Groh mistakenly typed the description of
Ramirez's home instead of the alleged weapons.67
Groh claimed that he verbally described the things to be seized
to Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez prior to the search, but the Ramirezes
claim that Groh only spoke with Mrs. Ramirez and told her that
the officers were looking for ""an explosive device in a box.""68 Af-
ter not finding any illegal weapons, Groh and the officers left,
leaving only a copy of the warrant with Mrs. Ramirez.69 No sub-
sequent charges were filed against the Ramirezes.7 ° After a re-
quest by the Ramirezes' attorney the following day for a copy of
the application and affidavit, which were under court seal, Groh
faxed him a copy of the page of the application listing the things
to be seized.71
The Ramirezes subsequently sued Groh and the other officers
under Bivens and 42 United States Code section 1983,72 alleging
eight causes of action, including a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.7 3 The United States District Court for the District of
Montana entered summary judgment for all defendants, finding
63. Id. at 1288.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. In the portion of the form requiring a description of the "person or property" to
be seized, the warrant stated: "'[Tihere is now concealed [on the specified premises] a cer-
tain person or property, namely [a] single dwelling residence two story [sic] in height
which is blue in color and has two additions attached to the east. The front entrance to the
residence faces in a southerly direction.'" Id. at 1288 n.2 (alteration in original).
68. Id. at 1288 (quoting Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1026
(9th Cir. 2002)). Groh claimed that he "orally described the objects of the search to Mrs.
Ramirez in person and to Mr. Ramirez by telephone." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
73. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1288-89.
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that there was no constitutional violation and, even if there were
a constitutional violation, all the defendants would be entitled to
qualified immunity.7" The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment with respect to all defen-
dants and all claims, except for Ramirez's Fourth Amendment
claim against Groh.75 The Ninth Circuit held that the search was
unconstitutional because the warrant failed to describe particu-
larly the things to be seized.76 The court further held that the
search team members were entitled to qualified immunity, but
not Groh, the team leader.77
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari"
and affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. 9 While the Court did
not provide specific reasons for granting certiorari, it is clear that
the case gave the Court an opportunity to address confusion
among the lower courts regarding the cure of a warrant lacking
in particularity ° and regarding the "clearly established" re-
quirement for asserting qualified immunity.8' Seven of the Jus-
tices, five in the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens and
two in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Kennedy, agreed
that the search was unconstitutional based on the warrant's fail-
ure to describe particularly the things to be seized.82 In a nar-
rower five-to-four decision, the Court held that Groh was not en-
titled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer leading
a search could presume a warrant, which plainly did not comply
with the particularity requirement, was valid. 3
74. Id. at 1289.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court of appeals determined that Groh was not entitled to qualified im-
munity for failing to read the warrant and satisfying himself that he understood the docu-
ment's scope and limitations. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
78. Groh v. Ramirez, 537 U.S. 1231 (2003).
79. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1295.
80. See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1289-93; supra Part II.B.2.
81. See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293-94; supra Part II.C.2.
82. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293, 1295.
83. Id. at 1294-95.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE GROH DECISION
A. Majority Opinion'
1. When the Plain Lack of Particularity Is So Deficient, the
Search Is Warrantless
Relying on the text of the Fourth Amendment itself, Justice
Stevens first established that the warrant was plainly invalid for
providing no description of the items to be seized.85 The fact that
the application adequately described those items was not suffi-
cient, because the warrant did not incorporate by reference the
description of the items in the application and the application did
not accompany the warrant.86 The majority distinguished the
warrant in this case, one that did not describe any of the items to
be seized at all, from one containing a "minor omission" or a
"mere technical mistake or typographical error." 7 Thus, because
the warrant was "so obviously deficient," the majority deemed the
search to be "'warrantless."'88
2. A Warrantless Search of a Defendant's Home Is
Presumptively Unreasonable
Justice Stevens, based on a "firmly established... 'basic prin-
ciple of the Fourth Amendment law,"' then affirmed the rule that,
absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless search of a home
is presumptively unreasonable.89 The majority emphasized ""the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable government intrusion"" goes to ""the very
84. The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 1287.
85. Id. at 1289. Justice Stevens noted that the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause
clearly provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.., and particu-
larly describing... the persons or things to be seized." Id.
86. Id. at 1289-90 ("The Fourth Amendment... requires particularity in the warrant
... ."). The court cited Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), for the general
rule that "a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment is unconstitutional." Id. at 988 n.5
87. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1290.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1290-91 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
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core" of the Fourth Amendment."'9 ° Thus, even where a search's
only defect is lack of particularity in the warrant, the presump-
tion of being unreasonable applies.9
3. A Search Based on a Warrant Plainly Failing the
Particularity Requirement Is Unconstitutional
Because there was no written assurance that the magistrate
found probable cause for all the items in the application, Justice
Stevens rejected Groh's argument that the search was reasonable
despite the warrant's lack of particularity.92 Additionally, citing
United States v. Chadwick,9 3 Justice Stevens relied on the pur-
pose of the particularity requirement of assuring the subject of
the search of the limits of the executing officer's power to
search. 4 Therefore, the majority concluded that because the war-
rant so plainly failed the particularity requirement, "proceeding
with the search was clearly 'unreasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment," and, thus, unconstitutional.95
4. An Officer Leading Such a Search Is Not Entitled to Qualified
Immunity
Having concluded that the search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment, Justice Stevens then "turn[ed] to the question whether
90. Id. at 1290 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)).
91. Id. at 1291.
92. Id. Groh reasoned that the goals served by the particularity requirement were
otherwise satisfied by a magistrate approving an application that contained the particular
items to be seized and the scope of the search not exceeding the limits set forth in the ap-
plication. Id.
93. 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) ("[A] warrant assures the individual whose property is
searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and
the limits of his power to search.").
94. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1292. While the majority acknowledged that the Fourth
Amendment does not require the executing officers to serve the warrant on the owner
prior to the search, the majority explicitly avoided deciding "[w]hether it would be unrea-
sonable to refuse a request to furnish the warrant at the outset of the search when.., an
occupant of the premises is present and poses no threat to the officers' safe and effective
performance of their mission." Id. at 1292 n.5. The Court also declined to consider whether
Groh's oral communication to the Ramirezes would have sufficiently fulfilled this purpose
because the Ramirezes dispute the existence of the communication, and, on a summary
judgment motion raised by Groh, all justifiable inferences were to be drawn in the Rami-
rezes' favor. Id. at 1293.
95. Id. at 1293.
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[Groh was] entitled to qualified immunity."96 Relying on the stan-
dard set forth in Saucier v. Katz,97 the majority first determined
that "no reasonable officer could believe" that a warrant plainly
not complying with the particularity requirement was valid.9" Be-
cause Groh was the preparer of the warrant, the Court reasoned
that he especially could not reasonably rely "on the Magistrate's
assurance that the warrant contained an adequate description of
the things to be seized."99 The majority also reemphasized that it
was also a well-established rule that, absent exigencies or con-
sent, warrantless searches of the home are presumptively uncon-
stitutional.'00 Thus, it would be clear to a reasonable officer that
proceeding with a search pursuant to a warrant that plainly fails
the particularity requirement was unlawful.'0 ' Therefore, ulti-
mately seeking to protect the "substantive right" of the subject of
a search to be assured "that a magistrate has duly authorized the
officer to conduct a search of limited scope,"102 the majority denied
Groh qualified immunity and affirmed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit. 103
C. Justice Kennedy's Dissent °4
Justice Kennedy first agreed with the majority, providing little
analysis, that the Fourth Amendment was violated in this case;
however, he concluded that Groh was entitled to qualified immu-
nity.' O5 For Justice Kennedy, this case involved a "straightfor-
96. Id. (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)).
97. 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). The Court specifically looked at "whether the right that
was transgressed was "'clearly established"-that is, 'Whether it would be clear to a rea-
sonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.'" Groh, 124 S.
Ct. at 1293 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).
98. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1294.
101. Id. Here, the Court relied here on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984),
where the Court observed that "a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing offi-
cers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.'" Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1294 (quoting Leon,
468 U.S. at 923). The Court then concluded: "This is such a case." Id.
102. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1294-95 n.9.
103. Id. at 1295.
104. Justice Kennedy's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id.
105. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Regarding the Fourth Amendment violation, Justice
Kennedy stated simply, "[tihe warrant issued in this case did not particularly describe the
things to be seized, and so did not comply with the Fourth Amendment." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
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ward mistake of fact."" 6 Based on a clerical error when filling out
the warrant, Groh mistakenly believed that the warrant con-
tained the proper language.'0 7 Justice Kennedy asserted that the
majority misapplied Leon because "[t]his is a case about an officer
being unaware of a clerical error, not a case about an officer rely-
ing on one."108 The pertinent question, therefore, was "whether an
officer can reasonably fail to recognize a clerical error."109 Justice
Kennedy argued that "[iln the context of an otherwise proper
search. . . , an officer's failure to recognize his clerical error on a
warrant form can be a reasonable mistake."10
D. Justice Thomas's Dissent"'
Justice Thomas first emphasized the need to address two sepa-
rate questions involving any Fourth Amendment case: 'whether
the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued in accor-
dance with the second Clause, and, if not, whether it was never-
theless "reasonable" within the meaning of the first.'""' 2 The Jus-
tice argued that the Ramirezes received the protection of the
Warrant Clause based on the magistrate reviewing the warrant
application and the supporting affidavit, both of which clearly
dissenting).
106. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For the majority's applica-
tion of Leon to this case, see supra note 101. The majority determined the central question
to be whether it was reasonable for an officer to rely on a warrant containing no descrip-
tion of the items to be seized. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy
asserted that "[n]o one suggests that the officer reasonably could have relied on the defec-
tive language in the warrant," but the officer was not aware of the defective language in
this case. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy relied in particular on Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), and the "ample room" that case provided "for mistaken judg-
ments." Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Malley, 474 U.S. at
343). Also, Justice Kennedy reasoned that it was more natural that Groh would miss the
clerical error because he was the preparer, given the difficulty sometimes in noticing one's
own errors. Id. at 1296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
111. Justice Thomas's dissent was joined by Justice Scalia, and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist as to Part Three, the qualified immunity portion of the dissent. Groh, 124 S. Ct.
at 1298.
112. Id. at 1299 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "By simply treating this case as if no warrant
had ever been sought," Justice Thomas argued, "the Court glosses over what should be the
key inquiry: whether it is always appropriate to treat a search made pursuant to a war-
rant that fails to describe particularly the things to be seized as presumptively unreason-
able." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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specified the items to be seized, and then signing those docu-
ments without making any adjustments or corrections. 113
Justice Thomas further determined that the search was rea-
sonable because, notwithstanding "the technical defect in the
warrant, it is hard to imagine how the actual search could have
been carried out any more reasonably.""' As conceded by the ma-
jority, the Fourth Amendment does not require an officer to
"serve the warrant on the searchee before the search."' 5 Thus,
Justice Thomas reasoned that Groh's prompt delivery of the list
of items to be seized the day following the search by request of
Ramirez's attorney was sufficient.
16
Even assuming the existence of a constitutional violation, Jus-
tice Thomas then argued that Groh was entitled to qualified im-
munity."7 For the Justice, Groh's "entitlement to qualified im-
munity... turn[ed] on whether his belief that the search warrant
was valid was objectively reasonable.""'8 Justice Thomas asserted
that it may be reasonable for an officer to believe that the war-
rant was valid, given the number of warrants officers prepare
and execute in a given year and the sometimes detailed and com-
prehensive supporting documents required."' Justice Thomas
concluded that, in this case, short of proofreading the warrant,
Groh could have done nothing more to ensure the reasonableness
of the search, and thus, should be entitled to qualified immu-
nity.120
113. Id. at 1300-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1301 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1302 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that the majority de-
fined the question on too general of a level. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also relied on Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), in which the Court suggested that, unlike an officer not
involved in the warrant application, an executing officer who is also the affiant might not
need to read the issued warrant. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1302-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989 n.6).
120. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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V. IMPACTS OF THE GROH DECISION
A. The Fourth Amendment Statutes of Warrantless Home
Searches
1. Is a Warrantless Search of a Home Per Se Unreasonable?
The first impact of this decision involves Fourth Amendment
interpretation in general. Seven of the Justices effectively held
that a home search, absent exigent circumstances or consent and
pursuant to a judicially approved warrant containing no descrip-
tion of the items to be seized, was per se unreasonable.'21 While
finding a search conducted outside the judicial process to be per
se unreasonable was not a novel holding,'22 the holding in this
case was more novel in that the search was not entirely outside
the judicial process. The federal agent did obtain judicial permis-
sion for the search with a proper application and affidavit.'23 This
case, therefore, had more to do with a federal agent mistakenly
believing the warrant contained information that it did not con-
tain,"' rather than simply a federal agent not obtaining a judi-
cially approved warrant at all. Because the majority opinion did
not include any language holding the search in this case to be
"per se unreasonable, " '25 it is unclear to what extent, if any, the
Court intended to extend the per se rule from searches conducted
"outside the judicial process" to searches conducted inside the ju-
dicial process, but which involved a facially deficient warrant by
mistake.
121. While the Court did not use the words "per se," the effect of the decision clearly
fits this description as Justice Thomas correctly concluded that Groh "could have done
nothing more to ensure the reasonableness of his actions than to proofread the warrant."
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) ("Time and again, this
Court has observed that searches and seizures "'conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.'"" (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984) (per curiam)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted)))).
123. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
125. The majority opinion deemed the search presumptively unreasonable, rather than
per se unreasonable. Groh, 124 . Ct. at 1290-91.
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The opinion did serve to clarify the Court's position regarding
the warrant requirement.126 Though some commentators have
perceived the Rehnquist Court as favoring the use of a reason-
ableness test, rather than imposing a warrant requirement, 127 the
Court made clear in this decision, at least in the context of a
home search absent exigent circumstances or consent, that a war-
rantless search is unconstitutional. 28 This per se rule also par-
ticularly reinforces the Fourth Amendment's protection against
arbitrary invasion of the home.'29
2. Particularity in the Actual Warrant: A Substantive Right
The next impact of this decision involves the strict interpreta-
tion of the particularly requirement by the Court. When deter-
mining whether a search is warrantless, a judicially approved
warrant containing no description of the items to be seized is no
better than a search with no effort to obtain any warrant at all.
30
Because of the substantive right of those subject to search to be
assured of the judicially imposed limits on the search, the Court
determined that a complete omission of the items to be seized
could not be characterized as a technical mistake where no exi-
126. See generally supra note 12.
127. See, e.g., Maclin, Complexity, supra note 12, at 928 ("The Rehnquist Court favors
reading the [Fourth] Amendment as simply requiring that all searches and seizures be
reasonable, not that warrants must be obtained beforehand.").
128. It must be remembered, though, that this decision was based on a defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense. When considering the
first inquiry regarding the qualified immunity issue-whether a constitutional violation
has occurred-all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the injured party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("[When] ruling on a motion for
summary judgment ... , [tihe evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifi-
able inferences are to be drawn in his favor."); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001) ("Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial
inquiry."). For additional analysis of Groh's impact on the reading of a warrant require-
ment into the Fourth Amendment, see Timothy P. O'Neill, 'Two Ideas' a Lonely Camp;
'One Idea' a Majority, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 12, 2004, at 5.
129, This is consistent with the opinion in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), au-
thored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, expressing in detail the Fourth Amendment's particu-
larly strong protection against invasions of the home. Id. at 614-18. It is unclear to what
extent, however, the Court will apply this per se rule to searches outside of the home.
130. Thus, if the warrant contains no description of the items to be seized, even if by
mistake or technical error, an otherwise valid home search is unconstitutional, absent exi-
gent circumstances or consent. See supra notes 91, 95, 101 and accompanying text.
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gent circumstances existed in the course of obtaining the war-
rant. 
131
This holding, therefore, runs contrary to approximately half of
the circuit courts, which have upheld a "functional equivalent"
standard132 or an "incorporation by reference or attachment"
standard,133 regarding the particularity requirement. While not
ruling on the issue, the majority did provide some guidance that
it would be enough for these jurisdictions to adopt the incorpora-
tion by reference and accompaniment standard. 134 The practical
impact of this finding places a burden on the executing officer to
ensure that either the warrant contains a description of the
things to be seized or the warrant incorporates by reference an
affidavit that contains such a description, such that a judicially
imposed limit exists in fact and in appearance.
135
Another potential impact highlighted, though not discussed in
detail in the majority opinion, involves the display of the warrant
to the subject of the search before commencing the search. While
the majority admitted that the Fourth Amendment does not re-
quire an officer to serve the warrant prior to commencing the
search, it specifically side-stepped answering "[w]hether it would
be unreasonable to refuse a request to furnish the warrant at the
outset of the search when, as in this case, an occupant of the
premises is present and poses no threat to the officers' safe and
effective performance of their mission."136 Given the emphasis the
majority placed on the substantive right of the subject of the
search to be assured of the authority and scope of authority of the
officer conducting the search,13 this decision moves the Court
closer to an affirmative answer to that question.
131. Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1290 (2004).
132. See cases cited supra note 32 and accompanying text.
133. See cases cited supra note 31 and accompanying text.
134. See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1290; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
135. The majority characterized the burden as a "duty to ensure that the warrant con-
forms to constitutional requirements," Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293 n.6, denying that it im-
poses a "novel proofreading requirement." Id. Because Groh could not have made the
search more reasonable, however, except by proofreading and having the magistrate cor-
rect the warrant, it is difficult to see this as anything but a proofreading requirement. The
Court determined that it was irrelevant whether the judicially imposed limits factually
existed, because without a written warrant particularly describing the items to be seized,
the appearance of a judicially imposed limit would not exist. Id. at 1291.
136. Id. at 1292 n.5.
137. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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B. Restriction on Qualified Immunity
Perhaps the greatest impact of this holding, though by a close
five-to-four decision, was the narrowing of the qualified immunity
defense for officers executing a search warrant. 13 8 First, this case
provides au example of a warrant "so facially deficient" that the
Court will deem presuming the warrant to be valid as unreason-
able, as described in Leon. 39 The Court effectively held that, for
such a warrant, neither a mistake of law, nor a mistake of fact,
would be reasonable. 4 ° Thus, the Court also narrowed the
Sheppard holding that "the exclusionary rule should not be ap-
plied when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively
reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neu-
tral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid,"'
by determining that no officer, absent exigent circumstances,
could reasonably rely on a warrant with no description of the
items to be seized to search a home.142
The Court also narrowed the "clearly established" standard.
Though over half of the circuit courts had held the "functional
equivalent" or "mere accompaniment" standards to be constitu-
tional,'43 and no Supreme Court decision based on analogous facts
had existed,144 the Court still held that the law requiring the war-
rant to be valid on its face was clearly established. 145 This case
thus provides an example of a law being clearly established even
though the specific action was not yet held unlawful by the Su-
preme Court nor by a majority of the circuit courts. 6 Therefore,
138. The Court's holding is limited to lead officers, not officers merely participating in
the search. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293 n.6.
139. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) ("[Dlepending on the circum-
stances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to par-
ticularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.").
140. As correctly asserted by Justice Kennedy, this case involved a mistake of fact,
rather than a mistake of law. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. The major-
ity, however, focused on whether any reasonable officer would believe that a warrant pro-
viding no description of the things to be seized was valid, not whether any reasonable offi-
cer would mistakenly believe that the warrant provided a description of the things to be
seized. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293.
141. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 (1984).
142. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 31-32.
144. See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1302 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145. See supra note 101.
146. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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an officer leading a home search pursuant to a warrant as facially
deficient as the one in this case, with no description of the place
to be searched for example, will less likely be entitled to qualified
immunity after this case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Groh decision stands to strengthen the particularity re-
quirement and to weaken qualified immunity. The Court effec-
tively implemented a per se rule regarding the particularity re-
quirement, declaring that no reasonable officer would execute a
warrant to search a home, absent exigent circumstances or con-
sent, when that warrant contains no description of the items to be
seized.'47 The Groh decision also opened officers to greater liabil-
ity by raising the level of generality acceptable for the law to be
"clearly established.""4 The Court declared a law to be "clearly
established" based on the text of the Fourth Amendment, even
when circuit court opinions differed and no Supreme Court opin-
ion based on analogous facts existed.'49
One impact of the Groh decision will be to proscribe the "func-
tional equivalent" and "mere attachment" standards for curing a
warrant lacking particularity. 5 ° Another impact will be to impose
a proofreading requirement on lead officers executing warrants to
ensure that the warrant contains a description of the items to be
seized or incorporates by reference another document containing
such a description.'5 ' Finally, the Court has left several areas of
confusion, true to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to be de-
cided in future decisions, including the right to see the warrant
prior to the search,' 52 the specific requirements necessary to cure
a warrant,' 53 as well as what other laws causing confusion among
the circuit courts will be deemed "clearly established."'5 4 While
147. See supra Part V.A.
148. See supra Part V.B.
149. See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1302 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 31-32,
45 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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there may be disagreement as to whether the Court came to the
correct conclusion in this case, the decision at least goes towards
cleaning up the "mess" of Fourth Amendment law.
C. Brandon Rash
PREFACE
The famous French political observer, Alexis de Tocqueville
once wrote, "Scarcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial ques-
tion."1 Though de Tocqueville wrote those words almost 200 years
ago, they apply more than ever today. Currently, the United
States finds itself in an era of unprecedented judicial power. Fed-
eral courts increasingly exert their influence over all aspects of
our society. As the power of the federal courts has increased, it is
really no surprise that the judicial selection process has become
increasingly contentious. In not so subtle terms, the political bat-
tles have shifted away from legislative battles towards who will
sit on our courts, who will determine our moral ideology, and who
will control our Constitution. Right or wrong, ultimately judges
determine much of our societal framework. As former Chief Jus-
tice Charles Evans Hughes once said: "We are under a Constitu-
tion, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is."2
In the past few years, the Supreme Court of the United States
has decided issues encompassing the right to privacy, homosexual
sodomy, free speech, and even presidential elections. This doesn't
even include the important decisions held by lower federal courts
that never even reach the Supreme Court. Perhaps de Tocqueville
said it best when he wrote that he was "not aware that any na-
tion of the globe has hitherto organized a judicial power in the
same manner as the Americans"3 and that "a more imposing judi-
cial power was never constituted by any people."4
1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1980) (1945).
2. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES 144 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S Tulchin eds., 1973).
3. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 98.
4. Id. at 150.
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Alexander Hamilton once described the judiciary as the "least
dangerous" branch.5 It is interesting to wonder what he would
think of the judiciary today.
I will leave the detailed analysis of federal judicial selection
and judicial legitimacy up to the much better qualified experts in
this book though I will end my analysis with one final de Toc-
queville quote. De Tocqueville rather alarmingly summarized the
importance of judicial selection by declaring that "if the Supreme
Court is ever composed of imprudent or bad men, the Union may
be plunged into anarchy or civil war."6 While de Tocqueville's
fears of anarchy and civil war may seem a bit extreme nowadays,
hindsight proves that when he expressed those fears in 1835 they
served as an amazing foreshadowing of the Supreme Court's Dred
Scott v. Sandford7 decision in 1856 and the subsequent American
Civil War.' If nothing else, de Tocqueville's fears should remind
us not to underestimate the importance of selecting who controls
our judicial system.
With that said, on behalf of the University of Richmond Law
Review, it is my pleasure to present the 2004 Allen Chair issue.
This year marks the twelfth anniversary of the Allen Chair edi-
tion of the Law Review and focuses on the important issue of fed-
eral judicial selection.
On April 16, 2004, the University of Richmond School of Law,
the University of Richmond Jepson School of Leadership, and the
University of Richmond Law Review gathered leading experts on
federal judicial selection for the Allen Chair Symposium. The an-
nual Allen Chair Symposium serves as a forum for debate on spe-
cific issues of timely legal significance. The Allen Chair book is
published by the University of Richmond Law Review several
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("[Tihe judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
them.").
6. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 152.
7. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
8. The Dred Scott decision ignited the already controversial slavery issue by holding
that African-American slaves were property and that the property laws of a slave-free
state could not grant slaves their freedom. This decision is widely considered to be one of
the more unfortunate Supreme Court decisions and is frequently cited as an instigating
factor in the ensuing American Civil War (1861-1865).
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months after the Symposium and serves as its literary comple-
ment. As the authors within this book discuss, the issue of federal
judicial selection has always been an important issue subject to
political conflict. However, after recent years of contentious dis-
putes in the Senate and dissolving civility in the selection proc-
ess, the issue appears more important than ever.
The format of this book is organized into three sections. The
first two, entitled "Symposium Articles" and "Symposium Essay,"
feature articles by many of the distinguished panelists from the
Symposium.9 The authors of these articles represent academics,
historians, and judges. They have all shaped judicial theory
through their academic pursuits and preserved judicial history
through their historical writings. One author currently serves as
a distinguished member of our judicial system and provides first-
hand knowledge of the selection process. Each of their articles
serve as an important contribution to the judicial selection de-
bate.
In the third and final section of this book, entitled "Remarks
From the Senate," we are honored to have United States Senators
John Cornyn and Richard Durbin provide their views on federal
judicial selection. Both senators currently serve as members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee and are thereby second only to
the President of the United States in shaping our judicial system.
Both senators have served distinguished and honorable careers in
public service and are active participants in the judicial selection
debate. In this book they continue their pursuit to resolve the
problems surrounding judicial selection.
Specifically, Senator Cornyn provides three revised and up-
dated articles that previously appeared in the National Review
Online. They serve as an historical account of the ongoing debate
and present one side of the various issues. Senator Durbin, in
turn, has provided a response to Senator Cornyn's general argu-
ments. The contributions of these senators is especially signifi-
cant because our country was founded on the intelligent legal de-
bate of public servants. The practice first started with our
Founding Fathers in The Federalist Papers and similar publica-
9. Note that the entire Symposium can now be viewed online at http://law.richmond.
edulnews/media.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
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tions and continues today in modern media, newspapers, congres-
sional debates, and in some cases student-edited legal journals. It
is a tremendous honor for me and the entire Law Review to have
these two senators participate in this issue.
The solution to the judicial selection problems may not be
found in this book, and it may not occur anytime soon, though I
am confident that the solution lies in intelligent debate of the is-
sues and that these two senators will play prominent roles in
both the debate and the solution.
Though the opinions of the various authors in this book may
differ, each author has admirably contributed to an important is-
sue, all the while patiently dealing with my constant editing and
often terrible sense of humor. It has been an honor and a privi-
lege to work with every one of these authors and it is my simple
hope that they will be proud of this book and their contribution.
More than anything else, I sincerely hope this book will serve as a
positive contribution to the judicial selection discussion and com-
pel others to join the debate.
Sean Patrick Roche
Allen Chair Editor
Richmond, Virginia
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